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A famous paper by Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson opened up a new avenue
of research into the logic of belief and belief change [1]. One of the later extensions
is dynamic doxastic logic (DDL), which channels develops the AGM approach as a
modal logic. Work in this area continues.
It is noteworthy that the erstwhile interest in theory change of one of the founding
fathers of AGM was not in belief change but in normative change. What the late Carlos
Alchourro´n, professor of jurisprudence, had originally wanted was, it seems, a logic of
norms and norm change. Many years later it makes sense to ask whether there is a
dynamic deontic logic (D∆L, say) that pursues the ambition that Alchourro´n seems to
have had. In this note we outline a blueprint of an answer. As mentioned in the title of
this note, we proceed in three steps.
Already Georg Henrik von Wright, the founder of modern deontic logic, found that
deontic logic must be built on a logic of action. Accordingly, in step 1 we outline a
(fairly meagre) logic of action. It avoids a number of important but difficult topics,
such as agency, causality and intentionality.
In step 2 we develop a deontic logic which is dynamic in the sense of allowing for
what we call real actions. However, it is only in step 3 that also provides for what we
call deontic actions. The treatment is sketchy throughout, in particularly towards the
end. This is not a finished paper. It is not even a proper abstract of an almost finished
paper. It is what it says: a blueprint—and an uneven one at that.1
Step 1: A temporal logic of action
Model theory
Without giving rigorous explanations, let us outline some key concepts. The fundament
of any model will be a set (universe) U of points called the environment. Sequences of
points will be called paths; they can be either finite or infinite in one or two directions.
Two paths p and q can be combined into one path, denoted by pq, if p has a last
∗Some of the work reported in this note was carried out when the author was a fellow-in-residence at
N.I.A.S., the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Study at Wassenaar.
1So why publish? One reason is that it gives me a welcome opportunity to publicly thank the organizers
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element p(#) and q has a first element q(∗) and the two are the same (if not, we regard
the notation pq as meaningless).
Another fundamental model theoretical ingredient is that of a given set E of actions
or events in U.2 An event in U is a set of finite paths in U. If a is an event and p ∈ a,
we say that p realizes E (p is a realization of a). One can think of a number of set-
theoretical operations on events under which E is closed, for example, the sum a ∪ b,
the relative product a | b and the difference a− b. (But universal complement is not one
of them, nor is the Kleene star.)
Yet another fundamental concept is a given set H of (complete) histories in H:
paths in U that are complete in the sense that if f is a proper subpath of a history h,
then f is not itself a history. If a history is of the form hg, where thus the last element
h(#) of h is also the first element p(∗) of p, then we will refer to (h, g) as an articulated
history. One may say that (h, g) represents a particular way of looking at hg with h as
the past, g as the future and the point h(#) = p(∗) as the present.
We say that h is a (possible) past if hg ∈ H for some g, while g is a (possible) future
if hg ∈ H for some h, If h is a past, then we write cont(h) for the set {g : hg ∈ H}
of possible continuations (possible futures) of h. If S ⊆ cont(h) we say that S is a
possible open future of h. We refer to (h, S ) as a possible situation; if S = cont(h) we
say that (h, S ) is a possible actual situation. If g ∈ S , we refer to (h, g, S ) as a possible
scenario.
If f is a history or a past or a future we say that f includes an event a if f contains
a subpath that realizes a, and that f excludes a if there is no such subpath.
Syntax and meaning conditions
Our object languages must contain a denumerable set of propositional letters (primitive
formulæ) P0,P1, · · · ,Pn, · · · and a disjoint denumerable set e0, e1, · · · , en, · · · of event
letters primitive terms). In addition there will be an adequate supply of Boolean (truth-
functional) connectives as well as special operators to be mentioned; the latter will
include at least the sum operator (+) and the catenation operator (;). Whatever the
details, our language will contain both formulæ and terms.
A basic frame is a triple (U, E,H) such that U is a universe, E is a set of events
(with certain closure conditions) and H is a set of complete histories. A valuation is a
function V from the set of propositional letters into the power set of U and from the set
of event letters into E. This function is extended in a natural way to all pure Boolean
formulæ and to all terms. We will write ~φ for the value assigned to a pure Boolean
formula φ and ~α for the value assigned to a term α. Examples of meaning conditions
(φ and ψ are pure Boolean formulæ, α and β are terms):
~¬φ = U − ~φ,
~φ ∧ ψ = ~φ ∩ ~ψ,
~φ ∨ ψ = ~φ ∪ ~ψ,
2Many philosophers distinguish between actions and events, as they should. But for the limited purposes
of this note it is not important.
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~α + β = ~α ∪ ~β,
~α; β = ~α | ~β.
Relative to such a model it is easy to give meaning conditions also for temporal
operators. For example:
(h, g)  [F]θ iff (h′, g′)  θ, for all p, h′, g′ such that hp = h′ and pg′ = g
(and therefore h′g′ = hg),
(h, g)  [P]θ iff (h′, g′)  θ, for all p, h′, g′ such that h′p = h and g′ = pg
(and therefore h′g′ = hg),
(h, g)  [H]θ iff (h, g′)  θ, for all g′ ∈ cont(h).
Here [F] and [P] correspond to Prior’s G and H, respectively, while [H] is the operator
which has been read variously as “historically necessary”, “unavoidably” and “settled
true”. In a similar way it would be easy to add unary proposition-forming propositional
operators such as [NEXT], [LAST], [UNTIL φ] and [SINCEφ] (for all formulæ φ) with
obvious intuitive meanings (we omit the details).
We also want an operator of a more complicated kind, one that involves the con-
sideration of another model. In the notation so far we have suppressed the reference to
the modelM = (U, E,H,V), which has been taken for granted. To be explicit we could
have written something like (h, g) M θ in stead of just (h, g)  θ. This perspective is
necessary for the definition of [H : φ], where again φ must be a formula:
(h, g) M [H : φ] θ iff (h, g′) M′ θ, for all g′ ∈ contM′ (h),
whereM′ = (U, E,Hφ,V) and Hφ = { f : (h, f ) M φ}.
This new operator can of course be viewed as—is!—a conditional operator. But
noting the validity of the schema [H] θ ↔ [H : ⊤] θ, we think of [H : φ] as a kind of
“focus” operator: the operator [H] restricted to or focussed on φ. More specifically,
[H :φ] focusses on the set of futures described by φ.
The dynamic operators that we need are less common. First there are three propo-
sition-forming term operators occurs, occurring and occurred:
(h, g)  occursα iff g = pg′, for some finite path p ∈ ~α and (unique) future g′,
(h, g)  occurringα iff h = h′p and g = qg′, for some finite nonempty paths p
and q such that pq ∈ ~α, (unique) past h′ and (unique) future g′,
(h, g)  occurred α iff h = h′p, for some finite path p ∈ ~α and (unique) past h′.
The dynamic operators also include three complex formula-making operators [afterα],
[duringα] and [beforeα], where α must be a real term:
(h, g)  [afterα] φ iff (h′, g′)  φ, for all finite paths p such that p ∈ ~α and
h′ = hp and g = pg′,
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(h, g)  [duringα] φ iff (h′, g′)  φ, for all finite paths p, q such that pq ∈ ~α
and h′ = hp and g = qg′,
(h, g)  [beforeα] φ iff (h′, g′)  φ, for all finite paths p such that p ∈ ~α and
h = h′p and g′ = pg.
Note that Pratt’s well-known after-operator [α] is rendered in our idiom as [H][afterα].
Similar remarks relate to [duringα] and [beforeα].
Truth in a model and validity in a frame are defined along traditional lines.
The result operator
Minimality is a concept that surfaces in connexion with concepts such as conditionals
and belief revision. Ramsey was happy to accept a conditional “if A then B” if B would
be true in a situation in which things had been changed just enough to make A true. In
AGM type belief revision, a new piece of information is incorporated into one’s set of
beliefs by making a certain minimal adjustment. Makinson has given other examples
of conceptual analysis where minimality shows its face.
One such example is offered by what may be called resultative actions or events. In
everyday life there may be many ways in which a certain state of affairs can result, but
talking about them we automatically filter out from consideration ways that are extraor-
dinary or inappropriate. Thus we need to try to capture the notion of “bringing it about
that P” or “the coming about that P”, where P is a proposition: the “paradigmatic” or
“standard” event resulting in its being the case that P. And this is where minimality
comes in.
To proceed more formally, say that f is a selection function for U if f is defined on
the set of subsets of U and the following three conditions are satisfied: for all P and Q,
f P ⊆ P (inclusion),
if P ⊆ Q, if f P , ∅ then f Q , ∅ (moneys),
if P ⊆ Q and P ∩ f Q , ∅ then f P = P ∩ f Q (arrow).
Let (U, E,H) be a basic frame and F a function defined on U such that, for each
u ∈ U, Fu is a selection function for U. Assume that E is closed under F in the sense
that FuP ∈ E, for each point u ∈ U and proposition P. Then F is called the result
functor while (U, E, F) is called a result frame.
On the syntactic side we add a new term-forming propositional operator ∂ and a
new meaning-condition:
~∂φ = {(u, v) : v ∈ Fu~φ}.
The notions relating to the idea that some actions have results is important, and it
is possible to develop it along with other ideas in this note. However, for reasons of
simplicity we will not pursue this topic further here.
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Step 2: Deontic logic with real actions
Pre-theoretical remarks
A norm draws a distinction between what is acceptable and what is not: what is in
accordance with the norm and what is not. Legal codes separate legal from illegal,
moralities right from wrong and good from bad, conventions correct from incorrect,
fashion what is “in” from what is “out”, and so on. In real life norms are never sharp
enough or complete enough to settle all questions, but in the norms that appear in this
note are supposed to be both sharp and complete.
Thus we may think of a complete norm as a norm-giver (legislator, moral genius,
arbiter, God) who can answer all questions as to what is normal (= in accordance with
the norm) in any given situation. With respect to any given past, however irregular
from a normative point of view, the norm-giver should be able to delineate a subset
consisting of exactly those futures that are still possible at that time and that are in
accordance with the norm.3
Traditionally the major deontic notions are obligation, permission and prohibition.
In the dominant Seinsollen (“ought-to-be”) tradition they are treated as concepts ap-
plying to propositions. In our modelling, as presented so far, it seems more natural
to follow the Tunsollen (“ought-to-do”) tradition, in which they are treated as concept
applying to actions or events. Thus here we classify the deontic status of an action
or event according to whether it is must or may be done or omitted. Furthermore, we
limit ourselves to one special case among many: “be done” shall mean “be done at
least once”, and “omitted” shall mean “be omitted altogether”.4
a is obligatory iff a must be done,
a is permitted iff a may be done,
a is forbidden iff a must be omitted,
a is non-obligatory iff a may be omitted.
The fourth notion, non-obligation, is not standard, and our terminology is not ideal.
However, it is not easy to think of a term that is really apt.5 In any case pre-theoretical
intuitions dictate that no action is ever forbidden and permitted at the same time. By
the same token, an obligatory action is always not non-obligatory. Hence if we were
3Thus in this modelling we are committed to the view that there are no “moral dilemmas”. However
irregular or illegal your past, there will always be a possible legal future. This commitment is of course not
of a logical nature. It would be possible to modify our modelling so as to accommodate philosophers who
believe in the existence of moral dilemmas.
4Actually also the given conditions are still quite general—further conditions can characterize different
varieties of the general case. For example, if a is permitted, will a still be permitted if done once? If a is
forbidden, will a still be forbidden if done once?
5There are also two other instances of linguistic awkwardness. In order to follow the pattern permit /
permitted / permission we will usually choose forbid / forbidden / forbiddance, rather than, for example,
prohibit / prohibited / prohibition. Furthermore, we accept order / obligatory / obligation rather than insisting
that order be replaced by obligate.
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to limit ourselves to so-called closed systems—systems in which every action is ei-
ther permitted and forbidden, and in which actions that are not non-obligatory are
obligatory—then we would have
a is permitted iff a is not forbidden,
a is non-obligatory iff a is not obligatory.
In other words, in closed systems we could begin with the two notions of obligation
and forbiddance and define the other two. But in general we need all four.
In addition to these unconditional concepts there are numerous conditional ones: a
is obligatory / permitted / forbidden / non-obligatory relative to certain condition.
Model theory, syntax and meaning-conditions
A norm for a basic frame (U, E,H) is a function N defined on the set of situations
which, for any situation (h, S ), where S ⊆ cont(h), assigns a set N(h, S ) (intuitively,
the set of normal futures, that is, normal from the point of view of this situation). There
are four conditions on N:
(i) N(h, S ) ⊆ S (choice);
(ii) if S ⊆ T then N(h, S ) , ∅ only if N(h, T ) , ∅ (moneys);
(iii) if S ⊆ T then N(h, S ) = S ∩ N(h, T ) (arrow);
(iv) if g = pg′, for a finite path p, then g ∈ N(h, S ) only if g′ ∈ N(hp, S ′), where
S ′ = { f ∈ fut(p(#)) : p f ∈ S } (coherence).
Notice that a norm-giver must be able to handle not only situations in which S =
cont (h(#))—in order to be complete, the norm must govern every imaginable situation.
Note that in this modelling there are no degrees of non-normality.
The major new operators are four unary formula-forming term operators ob, pm, fb
and no. Given a basic frame (U, E,H) and a norm N, truth-conditions of formulæ can
be given with respect to articulated histories:
(h, g)  obα iff for all finite paths p such that h(#) = p(∗), if p excludes ~α
then
• pf includes ~α,
for all f ∈ N(hp, cont(hp)),
• if f ′ = q f ′′, for any q ∈ ~α and f ′ ∈ cont(hp),
then k excludes ~α, for some k ∈ N(hpq, cont(hpq)).
(h, g)  pmα iff for all finite paths p such that h(#) = p(∗), if p excludes ~α
then
• pf includes ~α,
for some f ∈ N(hp, cont(hp)),
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• if f ′ = q f ′′, for any q ∈ ~α and f ′ ∈ cont(hp),
then k excludes ~α, for some k ∈ N(hpq, cont(hpq)).6
(h, g)  fbα iff for all finite paths p such that h(#) = p(∗), if p excludes ~α
then
• pf excludes ~α,
for all f ∈ N(hp, cont(hp)),
• if f ′ = q f ′′, for any q ∈ ~α and f ′ ∈ cont(hp),
then k includes ~α, for some k ∈ N(hpq, cont(hpq)).
(h, g)  noα iff for all finite paths p such that h(#) = p(∗), if p excludes ~α
then
• pf excludes ~α,
for some f ∈ N(hp, cont(hp)),
• if f ′ = q f ′′, for any q ∈ ~α and f ′ ∈ cont(hp),
then k includes ~α, for some k ∈ N(hpq, cont(hpq)).7
As explained in the following section, the definition of obα owes much to Ross
[4]. The definitions of the other three operators have been designed to “harmonize”
with that of obα.
We omit meaning-conditions for the conditional deontic operators ob(α/φ), pm(α/φ),
fb(α/φ) and no(α/φ).
Seinsollen and Tunsollen
A question sometimes aired in the philosophical literature concerns the relative primacy
of Seinsollen and Tunsollen. Three views are possible: (i) that Seinsollen is the basic
concept and that Tunsollen can be defined in terms of it and non-deontic concepts; (ii)
that Tunsollen is the basic concept and that Seinsollen can be defined in terms of it and
non-deontic concepts; and (iii) that both concepts are basic and that neither is definable
in terms of the other. In this note we are not taking a stand on this issue. For our
(limited) purposes we find the Tunsollen approach congenial, but it would certainly be
possible to introduce a deontic propositional operator in terms of which our deontic
term operators would be definable.
Here is one way of doing it. Let [D]—D for deontic—be a new unary proposition-
forming propositional operator with the truth-condition
(h, g)  [D]φ iff (h, g′)  φ, for all g′ ∈ N(h).
This operator may perhaps be read as “it is deontically necessary that” or “ideally”.
But it is too weak to be identified with “it ought to be the case” or “it is obligatory
that”.
6This defines a “weak” concept of permission. It must be possible to define “strong” concepts of permis-
sion as well.
7This defines a “weak” concept of non-obligation. Cf. the previous footnote!
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With the help of this new operator our four deontic term operators can now be at
least implicitly defined since the following schemata are logically valid:8
obα↔ [UNTIL(occurredα)]
([D]〈F〉(occurredα) ∧ [H](occurredα→ [afterα]¬obα),
pmα↔ [UNTIL(occurredα)]
(〈D〉〈F〉(occurred α) ∧ [H](occurredα→ [afterα]¬pmα),
fbα↔ [UNTIL(occurredα)]
([D]|F]¬(occurredα) ∧ [H](occurredα→ [afterα]¬fbα),
noα↔ [UNTIL(occurredα)]
(〈D〉〈F〉(¬occurred α) ∧ [H](occurredα→ [afterα]¬noα).
Thus in this sense the deontic term operators are definable in terms of a deontic
propositional operator and other non-deontic operators. On the other hand, given the
deontic term operators as well as the resultative operator ∂ mentioned above, we would
be able to define the usual deontic propositional operators. For example, obligation
operators O and O′ can be defined and seem natural under certain circumstances:
Oφ↔ ob ∂φ,
O′φ↔ ob ∂([F]φ).
In a similar way the other terms operators also give rise to propositional operators.
Interludium: three so-called paradoxes
There is a family of conundrums in the literature on deontic logic, known as paradoxes.
Most or all of them have been raised in order to make a certain point: that the paradox
in question cannot be formalized within any of the then current systems of deontic
logic. When new systems of deontic logic are presented it is therefore a good idea to
see if and how they can handle these “paradoxes”. The modelling presented in this
section allows us to deal with some but not all of them. We give three examples.
Chisholm’s Paradox. This well-known paradox, which was first formulated by R.
M. Chisholm in [2], turns on the difficulty of finding a model for four propositions of
the following kind:
(C1) It ought to be the case that if X will do B then X does A (as soon as possible).
(C2) If X will not do B, then X should not do A (ever).
(C3) X ought to do B.
(C4) X will not do B.
8To repeat what has already been said: there are other ways of defining formal operators that may be
claimed to correspond to pre-theoretical intuitive concepts.
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If one tries to formalize these propositions in Standard Deontic Logic (neglecting
the tense-logical aspect), the first two are naturally rendered on the format O(φ → ψ)
and φ→ Oψ, respectively; and contradiction results.
In one familiar version of this example, B stands for X’s going to see his grand-
mother, while A is notifying her in advance. The situation described is well-known:
X will fail to do his duty. But with this understanding of the situation it is not clear
that (C1) and (C2) are the only way to formalize the human predicament facing X. The
propositions
(C∗1) It ought to be the case that if X will not do B then X does not do A.
(C∗2) If X will do B, then X should not do A.
would also be true of the hypothesized situation. Of course, Chisholm chose his formu-
lations with an eye to bringing out the limitation of SDL. Our concern would perhaps
disappear if we could find a new, binary connective O(φ, ψ) (different from the ordinary
unary O, although we use the same letter for both operators), meaning something like
”φ commits to ψ” or ”φ makes obligatory that ψ”. Then (C1) and (C1) could be ren-
dered as O(φ, ψ) and O(¬φ,¬ψ), respectively. Moreover, if O(φ, ψ) → (φ→ Oψ) were
generally valid, everybody could be happy. (There are such solutions in the literature.)
In our present setting our “solution” to Chisholm’s Paradox has to be different,
but in principle it follows the same line. If α and β are two distinct event letters, our
recommended translation is:
(C′1) [H : 〈F〉 occurs β] obα.
(C′2) [H : ¬〈F〉 occurs β]¬obα.
(C′3) ob β.
(C′4) ¬〈F〉 occurs β.
The problem is then reduced to finding a model and an index (h, g,H) at which all four
formulæ are true. One would have to find sets
H1 = {g′ ∈ contH(h) : (h, g′,H)  〈F〉 occurs β},
H2 = {g′′ ∈ contH(h) : (h, g′′,H)  ¬〈F〉 occurs β}
such that
(i) (h,H1)  obα,
(ii) (h,H2)  ¬obα,
(iii) (h,H)  ob β,
(iv) (h, g,H)  ¬〈F〉 occurs β.
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But this task is easily solved. Hence our system may be said to pass the Chisholm test.
The Ross Paradox. The Ross Paradox is Alf Ross’s challenge in [4] to imperative
logic provide a plausible formalization of the imperative “Post this letter!” that does
not imply the imperative “Post this letter or burn it!” The parallel challenge to deontic
logic is of course to provide a system in which “Posting the letter is obligatory” does
not imply “Posting the letter or burning it, is obligatory”. Standard Deontic Logic of
course fails to meet Ross’s challenge since it validates the schema
(R1) Oφ→ O(φ ∨ ψ).
Ross’s own advice was to distinguish between what he called the logic of validity
and the logic of satisfaction. According to him there are two sides to the concept of
obligation: it is one thing for an obligation to be in force (valid, in his terminology),
another to be discharged (satisfied, in his terminology). We can rephrase his insight
by saying that a (one-time) obligation remains in force as long as it has not been dis-
charged. But once discharged, that particular obligation is no longer in force.
In the logic presented in this paper (which follows the analysis first given in [5])
Ross’s example is formalized in a different way:
(R2) obα→ ob (α + β).
It is easy to see that this is not a valid schema. Hence our system passes the Ross test.
Forrester’s Paradox. Forrester’s Paradox, first presented in [3], is the challenge to
formalize sentences like
(F1) “Don’t kill her! But if you do, do it gently!”
With respect to some model, let a be the event (action) of killing, and let b be any
sub-event of a. In other words, b ⊆ a. We might then re-state the situation by saying
that, while a is obligatory, given that a will not be done, b is obligatory. Calling up our
focus operator, we might try the formula
fbα ∧ [H : 〈F〉 oocursα] ob β,
or perhaps
fbα ∧ [H : 〈F〉 oocursα] (ob β ∧ fb (α − β)),
where a = ~α and b = ~β. This formalization goes some of the way towards catching
the structure of the further example
(F2) Don’t kill her! But if you do, do it by giving her enough sleeping-pills (and not
in any other way)!
at least if we consider that feeding someone sufficiently many sleeping-pills is a way
of killing someone. But killing-gently is not in the same sense a sub-event of killing.
Every element p of a is a particular realization of a. But, in a different sense of re-
alization, p itself can be realized in different ways, depending on what a is—perhaps
gently, perhaps quickly, perhaps carefully. And this concern performance, an aspect
that the present formalism cannot do justice to. Thus Forrester’s “paradox” marks one
limitation of the present modelling.
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Step 3: Deontic logic with both real and deontic actions
Pre-theoretical remarks
In addition to real actions, there are deontic actions. Corresponding to each of the basic
deontic categories obligation, permission, forbiddance and non-necessitation there is a
type of deontic action. The norm giver may order an action, making it obligatory. He
may permit it, making it permitted. He may forbid it, making it forbidden. He may
non-obligate it,9 making it non-obligatory. How are we to represent those obviously
crucially important actions?
One thing to keep in mind is the roˆles played in our formal semantics by the prim-
itive technical concepts E and H. The former identifies the sets of finite paths that
are recognizable as event types. The latter tells us which complete histories are really
possible (where “really” means ’really’!).
The deontic actions we are primarily interested in in this note are ordering, permis-
sion, prohibition, and non-necessitation: for any action or event a,
• to order a: to make a obligatory (“a must be done!”)
• to permit a: to make a permissible (“a may be done!”)
• to prohibit a: to make a forbidden (“a must be omitted!”)
• to declare a non-obligatory: to make a non-obligatory (“a may be omitted!”)
Here we shall be content to single out one specific explication for each of them.
There are other possibilities that deserve to be considered, but the interest here is in the
general problem of formalization rather than in a philosophical discussion of particular
definitions of deontic conepts.
This said, here is our semi-formal understanding of the four actions that we want
to formalize:
• ordering a: as long as a has not been realized, every legal future includes a,
• permitting a: as long as a has not been realized, some legal future includes a,
• forbidding a: as long as a has not been realized, every legal future excludes a,
• non-obligating a: as long as a has not been realized, some legal future excludes
a.
Model theory, syntax and meaning-conditions
Let (U, E,H) be a basic frame. Norms are still functions N defined on the set of situa-
tions (h, S ) such that N(h, S ) is a subset of S . As before, real actions are sets of finite
sequences of points in U.10 What is new now is that deontic actions are relations in the
9Yes, it is linguistically awkward!
10More generally, deontic actions of order n may be viewed as relations in the set of n-order norms.
However, this idea is not developped here.
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set of norms. In fact, for simplicity we will assume that they are binary relations in the
set of norms. In particular, our four special deontic actions are analysed as follows:
• The deontic action of ordering an event a, ordering(a), is the set of all ordered
couples (N,N′) such that, for all real situations (h, S ),
N′(S ) = N{ f ∈ S : f includes a}.
• The deontic action of permitting an event a, permitting(a), is some set of ordered
couples (N,N′) such that, for all real situations (h, S ),
N′(S ) = N(S ) ∪ N{ f ∈ S : f includes a}.
• The deontic action of prohibiting an event a, forbidding(a), is the set of all or-
dered couples (N,N′) such that, for all real situations (h, S ),
N′(S ) = N{ f ∈ S : f excludes a}.
• The deontic action of non-obligating an event a, non-obligating(a), is some set
of ordered couples (N,N′) such that, for all real situations (h, S ),
N′(S ) ⊆ N(S ) ∪ N{ f ∈ S : f excludes a}.
Next we introduce four term-forming term operators !!, !, §§ and §. If (U, E,H)
is a basic frame, then the meaning-definition for terms is extended by the following
clauses. where α is a term and ~α is a real action or event:
~!!α = ordering(~α),
~!α = permitting(~α),
~§§α = forbidding(~α),
~§α = non-obligating(~α).
Time for truth-conditions. The plot thickens! Unfortunately there is time only for
some very brief remarks.
When agents are capable of deontic actions, the notions of events and histories
much be generalized. Therefore frames will have to be more complicated than before.
Let us start with a basic frame (U, E,H). Now that we have deontic actions as well as
real actions, we need a new category D of deontic actions. Just as a real action or event
is a set of finite paths in U, so a deontic action ought to be a set of finite paths in M,
where M is a motley of norms (in the sense of norm as defined above).
Furthermore, real histories are sequences of points in U. But now we need a more
inclusive category! Let us use the word chronicle for sequences of pairs (h,N), where
h is a past history and N is a norm, and let us write K for the set of all chronicles. The
notions of maximal chronicle, articulated chronicle, past chronicle and future chronicle
can be defined in analogy with the corresponding historical concepts. If c is a past
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chronicle. the real past history of c can be retrieved; and if c(#) = (u,N) is the last
element of c then we call N the legal or normative position after h. It is clear that
corresponding to each chronicle in K there is a unique history in H.
Hence our new frames become ordered tuples (U, E,H, M,D,K), with various con-
ditions regulating the primitives. Given a model on such a frame, truth-conditions can
be given with respect to articulated chronicles (c, d). All our old truth-conditions have
to be generalized, but we will spare readers the details except for the conditions per-
taining to our four favourite deontic actions:
(c, d)  [after !!α]θ iff there are h,N,N′ such that c = (h,N) and d = (h,N′) and
(N,N′) ∈ ~!!α,
(c, d)  [after !α]θ iff there are h,N,N′ such that c = (h,N) and d = (h,N′) and
(N,N′) ∈ ~!α,
(c, d)  [after §§α]θ iff there are h,N,N′ such that c = (h,N) and d = (h,N′) and
(N,N′) ∈ ~§§α,
(c, d)  [after §α]θ iff there are h,N,N′ such that c = (h,N) and d = (h,N′) and
(N,N′) ∈ ~§α.
Ability and competence
In order to drive a car you need to know how to manœuvre it (real ability). But in order
to do it legally, you also need a driver’s licence (legal competence). The ability you
acquire by learning. The competence can be bestowed upon you by the Department of
Motor Vehicles, which under certain circumstances will issue a licence to you (a deon-
tic action). That authority has itself been established by another higher-order authority
(a higher-order deontic action). Which in turn draws its authority from somewhere
(from some even higher-order deontic action). And so on. (In human affairs, this kind
of regression of authority is always finite.)
Let us see how ability and competence can be analysed within the formalism de-
velopped here. Suppose (U, E,H,N,D,K) is a new frame. Let S i be a function on the
set of possible pasts h such that always S i(h) ⊆ contH(h). The informal intuition is that
S i(h) is the set of possible futures after h that the agent i controls in the sense that by
his action he can make sure that the actual future will turn out to be one of the elements
of S i(h). There are two obvious concepts of ability:
i is weakly able after h to realize a iff some f ∈ S i(h) includes a,
i is strongly able after h to realize a iff every f ∈ S i(h) includes a.11
Assume that S ∗i is a function on the set of possible past chronicles c such that always
S ∗i (c) ⊆ contC(c). Then in analogy with the definitions of two concepts of ability there
are the two definitions that follows. Let (c, d) be an articulated chronicle in K and let a
be a deontic action in D.
11There are related concepts that can be defined in a similar vein, such as the opportunity to realize an
event at once.
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i is weakly competent after c to realize a iff some e ∈ S ∗i (c) includes a,
i is strongly able after c to realize a iff every e ∈ S ∗i (c) includes a.
When a is one of our four simple deontic actions, weak and strong competence coin-
cide.
What is important in definitions of ability is the interplay between the primitives E
and H: both are needed. For definitions of competence, D and C play similar roˆles.
And then . . . ?
Let us call the basic frames (U, E,H) that we defined in step 1 zero-order frames. They
can be written on the form (U, E0,H0, M0), where M0 = ∅ is the set of zero-order
norms (there aren’t any!). In step 2 we considered zero-order frames with a norm N
that regulated the real actions in E0. In step 3 we met with frames that may be called
first-order frames: frames of the form (U, E0,H0, M0, E1,H1), where E1 is a set of
deontic actions (previously known as D) and H1 is a set of chronicles (K). Then why
not next add a norm N′ regulating the deontic actions in E1? And then . . . ? This is
obviously not the end, but rather the beginning of a long regress.
In principle we could define sets En of actions of order n (the actions of order 0
being the real ones); sets Hn of histories of order n, and sets Mn of norms of order n
(regulating actions of order n − 1, if n > 0). This would give us frames of the form
(U, (En,Hn, Mn)mn=0), where m should be a natural number (or possibly ω).
Even more general frames would be of the form (U, ((Ei,Hi, Mi)i∈I)) where I is an
index set with some structure to it. Certain families of frames of this kind might be of
interest in connexion with the study of hierarchies.
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